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The European Human Rights Convention: Time 
for a Radical Overhaul? 
by Andrew Drzemczewski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rather than provide a comprehensive analysis of the European Human Rights 
Convention'sl effectiveness, this Article provides an overview of the machinery 
set up thereunder and a short explanation of its uniqueness, followed by an 
overview of what has already been achieved in the Member States of the Council 
of Europe as a direct result of case law in Strasbourg. This will lead to an 
explanation as to why some observers believe that the machinery created under 
the Convention may have become a victim of its own success and in need of a 
radical overhaul. Over the years, a variety of proposals to change fundamentally 
the present Strasbourg human rights machinery have been put forth. 2 A recent 
Swiss initiative, discussed at a conference organized by the University of Neu-
chatel in March 1986, has received substantial support from many academics 
and practitioners and most certainly merits further consideration.3 This initia-
tive is likely to form the basis of serious discussions to be held under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe in the coming years, although it is still too early to 
speculate as to the chances of its success. 
II. AN OVERVIEW 
Drawn up within the Council of Europe, the Convention was signed on 
November 4, 1950 and came into force on September 3, 1953. This international 
instrument represents a collective guarantee at a European level of a number 
of principles set out in the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
supported by international judicial and quasi-judicial machinery making deci-
• LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Barrister. Legal Administrator in the Directorate of Human Rights, Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg. Any views expressed in this article are those of the author in his personal 
capacity. 
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950,213 V.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter The European Convention of Human Rights]. 
2 See e.g., A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY 330-41 (1983). 
3 The proceedings of this conference will be published in a forthcoming issue of THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW JOURNAL. 
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sions which must be respected by the 21 contracting state parties. This inter-
national regional guarantee mechanism is not a substitute for national machin-
ery which ensures the protection of human rights, but is a supplement to it. In 
fact, proceedings before the Convention institutions cannot be commenced until 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted. 
These institutions are the European Commission, and the Court of Human 
Rights, which have their seat in Strasbourg, France. Furthermore, the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is called upon to act in cases which 
are not brought before the Court. 
The Commission may receive petitions from a contracting party alleging 
violations of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention by another con-
tracting state. In addition, any person, group of individuals or non-governmen-
tal organization may also address petitions to the Commission against the con-
tracting party within whose jurisdiction he or they fall, so long as that contracting 
party has recognized, by express declaration, the competence of the Commission 
to receive such petitions. 
The Commission's principal task is that of inquiry and conciliation. If no 
friendly settlement is reached on the basis of respect of human rights, the 
Commission formulates a legal opinion and, as regards the subsequent proce-
dure, the Commission has the right, together with the States concerned, of 
referring the case to the European Court. 
The Court, for its part, is competent to take a judicial decision which is 
binding on the parties to the proceedings, on whether in a given case the 
Convention has been violated by a contracting state. If the Court is not seized 
of the case, it is for the Committee of Ministers to decide on the question of 
whether the Convention has been breached.4 
III. THE CONVENTION'S UNIQUENESS 
The European Human Rights Convention, although constructed upon tenets 
of traditional treaty law, differs from other international agreements in a num-
ber of fundamental respects. First, the concept of nationality is considered 
irrelevant. Article 1 of the Convention stipulates that the contracting parties 
"shall secure to everyone" (a louie personne) within their jurisdiction the substan-
tive rights and freedoms enumerated therein. Thus, whether an individual is 
stateless, an alien, a refugee, or a national of a particular state, is of no concern 
to the Convention organs. Second, the concept of reciprocity is inapplicable in 
terms of traditional contractual, synallagmatic agreements. In the first interstate 
case to come before the European Court of Human Rights, Ireland v. U.K.,5 in 
4 See Appendix I. , 
5 Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). 
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which the United Kingdom was found to be in breach of Article 3 of the 
Convention, a nonderogable provision, the Court had the opportunity to explain 
this point in no uncertain terms: "Unlike international treaties of the classic 
kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements be-
tween contracting states. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral 
undertakings, objective obligations which in the words of the preamble, benefit 
from a 'collective enforcement."'6 In addition, and on a related point, the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention are considered already to exist 
and be well protected in the 21 Member States' legal systems. In other words, 
the novelty of the Convention was not so much its content, that is the list of 
human rights provided therein, but rather the optional right of individual 
petition before the European Commission of Human Rights permitting for an 
eventual objective, outside verification as to whether in reality the said rights 
are effectively guaranteed domestically. Simply put, the institution of such a 
procedure, together with the possibility of a final determination by the European 
Court of Human Rights, is an achievement of major legal and political impor-
tance both in terms of historical precedent and comparative contemporary 
institutional analysis. 7 
IV. THE CONVENTION'S ACHIEVEMENTS 
The Convention's achievements have been quite staggering, though unfor-
tunately sometimes still confused with the institutions of the European Com-
munities.s In Austria, where the Convention has the rank of constitutional law, 
the code of criminal procedure has had to be modified as a result of case law 
in Strasbourg. The system of legal aid fees for lawyers has also been changed. 
In Belgium the penal code, vagrancy legislation, and civil code have been 
amended to ensure equal rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. More 
recently, a law concerning the public conduct of disciplinary proceedings before 
appeals boards of the orders of physicians and pharmacists has been adopted. 
6 [d. at 90-91, para. 239. Such international developments may have substantial domestic constitu-
tional repercussions. With respect to the issue of reciprocity expressly referred to in Article 55 of the 
French Constitution of 1958, see e.g., Droit international et droit francais, Etude du Conseil d'Etat, 4803 
La Documentation Fran~aise. Notes et etudes documentaires, 18 (1986). 
7 Although it can be argued that the Inter-American system has the potential to surpass achievements 
in Strasbourg (insofar as the American Convention on Human Rights is concerned), one must, 
unfortunately, bear in mind "that the substantive jurisprudence of the Commission and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights fades in the light of reality of the gross violations with which they are faced." 
Hannum, Book Review, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 261 (1986) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (T. Meron ed. 1984». 
It is still far too early to comment on the only other existing regional Human Rights mechanism, 
namely the O.A.V. African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, which recently came into force 
on October 21, 1986. 
8 The European Parliament also holds its sessions in Strasbourg. 
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In the Federal Republic of Germany, modifications have been made to the code 
of criminal procedure concerning pretrial detention, various measures have 
been taken to expedite criminal and civil proceedings, and transsexuals have 
been legally recognized. 
In the Netherlands, where some of the Convention's provisions are endowed 
with a hierarchically superior status to the Constitution itself, changes have been 
made in the military criminal code and the law on detention of mental patients. 
In Ireland, subsequent to the Airey case,9 court proceedings were simplified and 
civil legal aid and advice schemes set up. Sweden has introduced rules concern-
ing time limits for expropriation permits, and legislation is planned concerning 
the regulation of building permits. Switzerland has amended its military penal 
code and has reviewed completely its judicial organization and criminal proce-
dure as applied to the federal army. In addition, Switzerland has also amended 
its civil code regarding deprivation of liberty in reformatory centers. That is 
not all. Well over a hundred other instances can be cited where settlements have 
been reached either formally or informally, often with the Commission's or the 
Court's approval, subsequent to concessionary measures taken by the govern-
ments concerned. 
And what about the United Kingdom? Despite the fact that the Convention 
has not been incorporated into domestic law, as is also the case in Ireland, the 
Scandinavian countries, Iceland and Malta, its constitutional impact cannot be 
doubted: witness the overruling of a unanimous House of Lords decision by 
the European Court in the famous Sunday Times lO case or recent legislation 
enacted subsequent to the Malone telephone tapping case. ll Numerous other 
examples can be provided, such as the substantial changes in prison rules, a 
complete redrafting of mental health legislation, compensation for administra-
tive miscarriages of justice, changes of interrogation techniques used on detai-
nees, and the repeal of legislation prohibiting homosexual relations between 
male consenting adults in Northern Ireland. 12 
V. VICTIM OF ITS OWN SUCCESS? 
With such achievements behind the European Human Rights Convention 
Machinery, why even contemplate, let alone attempt to implement, any signifi-
932 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
10 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
1182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984). 
12 For a thorough overview of Strasbourg case law, consult P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1984) and the forthcoming book by 
the Commission's former President, J. FAWCETT, ApPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2d. ed. 1987). 
See also, Council of Europe, Collection of Resolutions Adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 
Application of Articles 32 and 54 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1959-1983 (1984), al'd the First Supplement thereto, covering the years 
1984-1985 (1986). 
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cant changes in the present framework? Quite simply, because there are indi-
cations that the present functioning of the Convention organs may be reaching 
breaking-point, both in terms of volume of work and related unacceptable delays 
in proceedings. Between 1958 and 1972 the European Court delivered on 
average one judgment a year. The average between 1981 and 1985 was eleven. 
In 1986 the Court rendered sixteen judgments. The European Commission of 
Human Rights, the filtering body, which holds five or six two-week sessions a 
year, with a secretariat consisting of less than 30 lawyers and some 15 support 
staff, deals with nearly 600 applications per year, many of which are of a diverse 
and highly complex nature. In the nationalization case, Lithgow v. U.K.,[3 hear-
ings before the Commission had to be held in the courtroom as the Commission's 
own deliberation room was inadequate and incapable of accommodating over 
20 lawyers representing the parties, the 21 Commissioners, their staff and 
interpreters. The proposed construction of a new Palais des Droits de I'Homme 
will probably not solve the problem. [4 Many, many more difficult problems are 
still unsolved. The part-time members of both organs and their respective staff 
are severely overworked. Even the Commission's president has indicated that a 
serious backlog of business is building up which he fears may escape the Com-
mission's control. Members of the Court have expressed similar anxiety, both 
concerning their workload and inadequate working conditions. 
Another closely related problem is that of delay. Although it takes an average 
of about six years for a case to be decided in Strasbourg, in some instances nine 
or ten years have elapsed before a case is resolved. Add to this the fact that 
France, Portugal, Spain and more recently Greece have now accepted the right 
of individual petition; tinkering with relatively minor procedural techniques in 
order to expedite and simplify proceedings may be insufficient. 
VI. MOVES FOR CHANGE 
These problems make it easy to comprehend the Swiss Government's initiative 
at the first European Ministerial Human Rights Conference in March, 1985 to 
propose a radical overhaul of the whole structure: do away with the Commission, 
whose work to a great extent overlaps with that of the Court; give an individual 
the right to take his case directly before the European Court of Human Rights,[5 
and eradicate the anomalous situation in which the Committee of Ministers, the 
executive political body of the Council of Europe representing the Member 
States, acts as an alternative decision-making body, now that all states, with the 
exception of Malta and Turkey, have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
13 104 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). 
14 See Council of Europe, Human Rights. Information Sheet No. 19, Doc. H/INF(86)1, 22, Appendix 
III (1986). 
15 As explained previously, only the Commission and State Parties concerned may refer a case to 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
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tion. 16 The Swiss government considers the present length of proceedings in 
Strasbourg as manifestly excessive. It asks how it can take the Strasbourg organs 
three years and ten months to find that domestic proceedings lasting three and 
a half years have exceeded a reasonable time as prescribed by Article 6 of the 
Convention. 17 
The right of individual petition, now accepted by 18 states, has fundamentally 
altered entrenched constitutional principles in many countries. The Convention 
in effect already provides for judicial review of sovereign legislative action when 
such legislation purportedly impinges on fundamental human rights guaranteed 
by the Convention. Thus, a streamlining of the present framework should not 
in itself alter the Convention's application. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What the Swiss government proposes, what the European Commission of 
Human Rights itself supports and what government representatives, judges and 
lawyers discussed at Neuchatel in March 1986 was the possible merger of the 
European Commission and Court into a single full time European Court of 
Human Rights directly accessible to the individual, assisted by advocates-general. 
An idea which, ironically enough, comes close to what was proposed at the 
Hague Congress of Europe in 1948: the creation of a Court of Justice with 
adequate sanctions in order to implement a European Charter of Human 
Rights. In other words, a European Constitutional Court. 
16 See supra note 3. See also, the comments of Prof. R. Higgins, Proceedings of the 77th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 396-97 (1983); see also, the forthcoming article 
of Hondius, The Other Forum (to be published in MtLANGES GERARD J. WIARDA). 
17 See Council of Europe Doc. MDH(85)1. 
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Appendix I 
SCHEMA OF THE IMPLEMENTATION MACHINERY 
OF THE CONVENTION 
FIRST STAGE Individual or State application 
Examination of the Admissibility 
15 




Wrthin the prescribed period of three months 
the Court may be seized of the case by: 
FINAL STAGE 
If the Court is not seized of the case 
within the period of three months 
Establishment of the Facts 
• 
FRIENDLY SETIlEMENT 
Ion the basis of respect 
for Human Rights) 
• End of the case 
Report transmitted to Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: 
Beginning of the three months 
The European Commission of 
Human Rights or 
The State 
or States concerned 
The Judgment is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers 
which supervises its execution. 
End of the case 
The Committee of Ministers decides 
whether there has been a violation 
If necessary the Committee supervises that the measures 
required by its decision are taken by 
the State concerned. 
End of the case 
Note: The right of individual petition (Article 25 of the Convention) and the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction (Article 46 of the Convention) are optional. 
